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The Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions acquiring weapons systems, supplies, 
and services. The contract management process has to be executed diligently to ensure 
the government is receiving the highest return on investment. The process has six steps, 
two of which relate to the source selection strategy: solicitation planning and source 
selection. Once the acquisition team determines whether to use a lowest price technically 
acceptable (LPTA) or Tradeoff source selection strategy, they evaluate proposals to 
determine which offer presents the best value to the government.  
The purpose of this research is to explore potential relationships between the 
source selection strategy (LPTA or Tradeoff) and resultant contract outcomes. This 
research uses data collected from contract files and related documentation from two 
major systems commands (Naval Air Systems Command and Naval Sea Systems 
Command) to show the implication of the LPTA and Tradeoff source selection strategies. 
The findings suggest that an LPTA source selection strategy has a significantly shorter 
lead-time to contract award. The findings should be viewed with caution, however, as the 
sample size consisted of only six LPTA contracts. This report concludes with two 
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With an annual budget approaching $600 billion, the Department of the Defense’s 
(DOD) spending power is greater than the gross domestic product of many nations. The 
Government Accountability Office reported that the DOD spent approximately $310 
billion acquiring major weapons systems, supplies, and services in fiscal year 2013 
(GAO, 2014). Government acquisition professionals use the contract management 
process as a road map to navigate the defense acquisition life cycle (Rendon & Snider, 
2008, 165). The contract management process consists of pre-award, award and post-
award phases. The pre-award phase includes procurement planning and solicitation 
planning; the award phase consists of the source selection, in which the contract is 
awarded; and, finally, the post-award phase consists of contract administration and 
contract closeout. 
A critical step in any acquisition program is choosing a contracting award strategy 
that will yield the highest benefit to the government. The two primary source selection 
strategies used by government acquisition professionals to determine the proposal that 
represents the best value to the government are lowest price technically acceptable 
(LPTA) and Tradeoff (also known as full Tradeoff [FTO]). While there are several 
strategies that can be used, the basic premise underlying all of these strategies is the 
relative importance of cost/price and non-cost/non-price factors (e.g., factors related to 
the technical capabilities, managerial capabilities, past performance, etc., of a proposal.) 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states that LPTA is “appropriate for use when 
best value is expected to result from selection of the technically acceptable proposal with 
the lowest evaluated price.” In this case, cost/price is the most important factor. Tradeoff, 
on the other hand, must be used when best value can be obtained by choosing the “other 
than the lowest priced offeror or other than the highest technically rated offeror” (FAR, 
2014, Part 15.101-1). In this case, cost/price may be less important than other non-
cost/non-price factors, and cost/price can be “traded off” for factors deemed more 
important for contract success. 
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A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to determine potential relationships between the 
source selection strategy (LPTA or Tradeoff) and resultant contract outcomes. The 
researchers seek to determine if relationships exist between the source selection strategy 
and various contract outcomes, such as procurement administrative lead time (PALT), 
cost and schedule overrun or underruns, contractor performance ratings, and other 
factors. The results of this analysis will be used to inform the DOD contracting 
community and their customers of the potential costs and benefits associated with 
choosing a particular source selection strategy. We hope to provide guidance that will 
help acquisition professionals choose the source selection strategy that is most 
appropriate for their requirement. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research intends to answer the following questions: 
1. How does the source selection strategy affect pre-award metrics (e.g., 
PALT, number of solicitation amendments, number of protests)?  
 
2. How does the source selection strategy affect post-award outcomes (e.g., 
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting Systems [CPARS] ratings, 
Earned Value Management [EVM] performance metrics)? 
 
3. Does one source selection strategy consistently fare better than the other in 
terms of both pre-award metrics and post-award outcomes?  
 
4. Does the contract outcomes (e.g., past performance data) justify the 
government paying a premium to award to other than the lowest bidder?    
C. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology consists of a literature review, data collection, data 
analysis, and determination of the findings. We analyzed the source selection process to 
include the best value continuum and the associated source selection strategies (LPTA or 
Tradeoff) used to obtain the best value. We reviewed completed contracts and contract-
related documentation from Naval Air System Command (NAVAIR) and Naval Sea 
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System Command (NAVSEA). The team also collected data from completed contract 
files, paying particular attention to the source selection plans and solicitations to 
determine which contracts were awarded based on an LPTA strategy and which were 
awarded based on a Tradeoff strategy. In the cases for which Tradeoff was chosen, the 
research team examined the award criteria to identify which criteria were most important 
in the source selection strategy. Commonly used evaluation criteria include, but are not 
limited to, technical, management, past performance, and cost. The data obtained from 
the contract files is used to determine potential relationships between the source selection 
strategy (LPTA or Tradeoff) and resultant contract outcomes. The data was analyzed 
using analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) procedures, which is used to determine if 
significant differences in contract outcomes exist between the two award strategies. 
D. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to determine potential relationships between the 
source selection strategy (LPTA or Tradeoff) and resultant contract outcomes. The 
benefits of this research will be to assist federal contracting agencies in planning there 
procurements and knowing the implications of a LPTA or Tradeoff source selection 
strategy in terms of the potential contract outcomes. If a pattern of contract outcomes is 
identified, this research could help naval, DOD, and federal acquisition professionals 
choose the strategy with the best chance of producing positive contracting outcomes, thus 
potentially saving time and money without reducing performance quality. For cases in 
which the Tradeoff process is used, this research may help assesses whether or not the 
contract outcomes justified paying a premium cost/price. 
E. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The primary limitation of the research is the size of the statistical sample. Due to 
time constraints and the size of the research team, only 36 contracts were reviewed. The 
time allotted to review contract files proved to be significantly shorter than what was 
needed to gather a larger sample size. Larger, more complex procurements naturally took 
longer to review and locate pertinent data. Another major challenge the team encountered 
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while collecting data was the lack of commonality in the contract files. Though each 
command required contracting professionals to utilize a contract file checklist, the team 
noticed a variety of interpretations and utilizations of the checklist. Some contract files 
were extremely organized and revealed that the contracting professional strictly adhered 
to the checklist, while others seemed to include only what the contracting professional 
deemed to be critical items. Consequently, the team spent a significant amount of time 
trying to locate the pertinent data, which resulted in a smaller sample size than 
anticipated. We still feel the data is worthy of analysis, however our conclusions should 
be interpreted with caution given the small sample size.   
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
This report is organized into five chapters, including this introduction. The next 
chapter, Chapter II, includes a review of the literature related to the contract management 
process, and source selection strategies. Chapter III provides an overview of NAVAIR 
and NAVSEA and their contract management strategies. Chapter IV presents the results 
and findings of the data collected and answer the research questions. Finally, Chapter V 
provides the summary, conclusion, and recommendations for further research. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a background of the research contained herein, including 
the purpose of the research, the research questions, methodology, benefits, and limitation 
of the research. The next chapter reviews the literature review associated with the 
contract management process and source selection strategies.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview to the federal government 
contract management process. This literature review familiarizes the reader with the three 
phases and six steps of the contract management process, highlighting how each step 
affects the determination of the source selection strategy. This chapter reviews when each 
source selection strategy (LPTA or Tradeoff) is appropriate according the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and other guidance. This chapter includes reports from 
investigative agencies that show the best value practices used by various government 
contracting agencies and the factors the federal government considers when choosing a 
source selection strategy. 
A. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
To understand the contract management process, one must first know the meaning 
of the word contract. The FAR (2014) defines a contract as  
a mutually binding legal relationship obligating the seller to furnish the 
supplies or services (including construction) and the buyer to pay for 
them. It includes all types of commitments that obligate the Government 
to an expenditure of appropriated funds and that, except as otherwise 
authorized, are in writing. In addition to bilateral instruments, contracts 
include (but are not limited to) awards and notices of awards; job orders or 
task letters issued under basic ordering agreements; letter contracts; 
orders, such as purchase orders, under which the contract becomes 
effective by written acceptance or performance; and bilateral contract 
modifications. Contracts do not include grants and cooperative agreements 
covered by 31 U.S.C.6301, et seq. (FAR, 2014, Part 2.101b) 
A slightly more understandable definition of a contract is a written document that 
confirms and communicates the agreement between buyer and seller, but first and 
foremost it helps develop and maintain professional business partnerships between the 
two (Garrett, 2010).  
There are several statutes and regulations that dictate how government contacts 
are managed. The statutes include the Small Business Act (SBA) of 1953, the Truth in 
Negotiation Act of 1962 (TINA), the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, the 
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Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA), and the Federal Acquisition 
Reform Act of 1996 (FARA). The primary regulatory guidance for federal government 
contracting is the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). 
(1) The Small Business Act of 1953  
The Small Business Act (SBA) requires contracting officers to ensure that small 
business concerns and small disadvantaged business concerns obtain their fair share of 
government contract awards (Nash, Schooner, Obrien-DeBakey, & Edwards, 2007). To 
be considered a small business, a company must be “organized for profit,” “have a place 
of business in the United States,” “operate primarily within or make a significant 
contribution to the United States economy,” and be “independently owned and operated” 
(FAR, 2014, Part 19.001). A small business must not be “dominant in its field on a 
national basis” (SBA, 2015).   
(2) The Truth in Negotiation Act of 1962 
TINA requires contracting officers to purchase supplies and services from 
responsible sources at fair and reasonable prices (FAR, 2014, Part 15.403). TINA 
requires offerors to submit certified cost or pricing data if a procurement exceeds the 
$700,000 TINA threshold (FAR, 2014, PART 15.403). Under TINA, the contracting 
officer obtains accurate, complete, and current data from offerors to establish a fair and 
reasonable price (DFAR, 2014, Part 215.403). Per Title 41 U.S.C. Chapter 35, TINA 
allows the government to hold contractors financially and possibly criminally liable if it 
is later found that a contractor “did not provide accurate, complete, and current cost or 
pricing data” (Truth in Negotiations Act, 1962),  
(3) The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 
CICA requires contracting officers to utilize full and open competition as the 
standard. CICA provides certain exceptions that contracting officers may use instead of 
full and open competition (e.g., SBA 8(a) small or disadvantaged businesses, HUBZone, 
veteran owned businesses, only one responsible source (FAR, 2014, Part 6302-1), 
unusual and compelling urgency (FAR, 2014, Part 6302-2). Unless the contracting officer 
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can justify an exception to CICA, full and open competition must be used in the 
solicitation and awarding of federal government contracts.  
(4) The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 and the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 
FASA and FARA are both designed to make government contracting more like 
the commercial sector, simplifying the procurement process and saving money. The 
FASA dictates a preference for the use of commercial items to fill the government’s 
requirements and simplifies the process to acquire them through the commercial market. 
When possible, acquisitions should move to a price-based, market-driven environment. 
Source selection must be made on a “best value” not “cheapest price” basis (Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2011). The FARA, later called the Clinger-Cohen 
Act, continues with FASA’s preference for commercial procurement by eliminating the 
requirement for cost and pricing data as well as expanding the definition of commercial 
item to include the following:  
• Items that have evolved from commercial items 
• Items that are commercial with modifications to meet government-unique 
requirements 
• Combinations of commercial items and services for government use 
• Non-developmental items (NDI), or items originally developed and/or 
sourced by a government agency 
• Services at catalog or market price 
(E. Yoder, personal communication, 2014) 
These reforms expand the definition of commercial items to encompass not only goods, 
but also virtually all types of services (Nash et al., 2007). 
(5) Federal Acquisition Regulation 
The primary regulation used by all federal government agencies in the 
“acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated funds” (FAR, 2014) is the FAR. It 
became effective on April 1, 1984, and is “prepared, issued, and maintained” within 
applicable laws under the joint authorities of the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator 
of General Services, and the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (FAR, 2014, Part 1.103b). Government agencies also have supplements to 
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the FAR with specific modifications that meet their own requirements. For example, the 
Navy/Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NMCARS) adds language to 
the FAR specifically for Navy and Marine Corps acquisitions. The following example 
shows where the NMCARS and the FAR differ. 
(a)(1) Cost or price evaluation. Methods of evaluation which assign a 
point score to cost or price and combine it with point scores for other 
evaluation factors generally should not be used [emphasis added]. Point 
scores can be helpful in summarizing subjective evaluation of technical 
and other factors, but are not needed in evaluating cost or price and tend to 
obscure the Tradeoff between cost/price and other factors, rather than 
clarifying it. If point scoring of cost/price is utilized, it should be 
demonstrated that the value of a cost/price point is comparable, in value to 
the Government, to the value of a non-cost/price point. When a cost 
realism analysis is performed, the resulting realistic cost estimate should 
be used in the evaluation of cost, except when using a firm-fixed-price or 
fixed-price with economic price adjustment type of contract. (NMCARS, 
2014, 5215.305) 
In the boldfaced text, the NMCARS specifically states that the use of a point scale 
should not be used as an evaluation factor for cost or price, even if used for other aspects 
of the Tradeoff process. The rest of the section refers to the higher FAR guidance. As 
previously discussed statutes and regulations dictate how government contacts are 
managed, the next section will discuss in more detail the contract management process. 
B. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
The previous section discussed statutes and regulations governing the contract 
management process. The next section will discuss in more detail the contract 
management process by looking at the three phases and six steps. Contracts are looked at 
from two very different perspectives. On one side is the seller (defense contractors, in this 
case), who provides goods (weapons systems or parts) or services in return for payment. 
The other is the buyer (government), who purchases goods and services through the use 
of contracts. A definition for contract management is “the art and science of managing a 
contractual agreement throughout the contracting process” (Garrett, 2010, p. 18). The 
DOD typically does not produce any of the items or services it requires to sustain itself 
through daily and future operations, so it must outsource, or rely on contractors, to fulfill 
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its requirements. Contracts, as stated previously, are legally binding documents that 
require the seller to provide the item or service and the buyer to pay for it, in so reducing 
uncertainty and risk involved in transactions. Contracts are the main way to ensure both 
the government and contractor understand exactly what the agreement entails, as it is all 
in writing. Understanding and adhering to the contract can help develop and maintain a 
professional and ethical relationship by both the government and the contractor. Based on 
Garrett (2010), there are three phases to the contract management process, and within 
those phases there are six steps for the buyer (government) and the seller (contractor). 
Figure 1 shows the flow of the six steps through the contract management process. For 
the purpose of this research, the focus is only on the steps of the buyer.  
  
Figure 1.  Contract Management Process (from Garrett, 2010, p. 20) 
1. Pre-award Phase 
In accordance with the FAR (FAR, 2014, Part 7.102) “all agencies will perform 
acquisition planning and conduct market research on requirements determined to have 
legitimate needs.” The results of that market research will be used to make decisions on 
whether or not the requirement will be sent to prospective contractors as a request for 
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proposal/quotation/information (RFP/RFQ/RFI), what factors will be used to determine 
best value to the government, and how the solicitation will be structured.   
(1) Step 1: Procurement Planning 
The procurement planning step is “the process of identifying which business 
needs can be best met by procuring products or services outside the organization. This 
process involves determining whether to procure, what to procure, how to procure, and 
when to procure” (Garrett, 2010, 81). As this is the initial step and stage, it is where you 
are planning the various aspects of the procurement (e.g., source selection strategy, 
contract type, contract structure, etc.) that will be used throughout the entire contract 
management process. The initial analysis of the requirement, or whether to “build or 
buy,” is done during this stage to determine what exactly is needed, be it a service or 
weapon system. Once the determination is concluded, market research must be conducted 
to find the most suitable approach to acquiring the requirement. Market research may be 
done though pre-solicitation conferences or other means. Risk analysis is conducted to 
determine the ability of industry to handle the requirement, the cost effectiveness of 
going forward with the proposal, and the best source selection strategy to use. A 
procurement management plan is created that describes the procurement process 
throughout the management of the contract. The development of an Invitation for Bid 
(IFB) or Request for Proposal (RFP) will then be drafted, as will preliminary documents 
to be used in the solicitation planning step.  
(2) Step 2: Solicitation Planning 
The solicitation planning step is “the process of preparing the documents needed 
to support the solicitation” (Garrett, 2010, p. 88). Prior to beginning this step, the 
procurement management plan will be reviewed. The statement of work (SOW) will be 
developed to explain in clear, concise language the work the contractor must 
accomplish.1 The SOW may be considered the most critical document in the acquisition 
process (Rumbaugh, 2010). Individuals from both the government and industry read the 
                                                 
1 Statement of objectives (SOO), work breakdown structures (WBS), and performance work statement 
(PWS) may be used as well or in place of SOW depending on contract type 
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SOW; therefore, if it does not reflect exactly the requirements as intended, severe issues 
in the contract administration process may occur. The SOW sets the bounds of the 
government’s requirements, enabling the contractor to accomplish them. The SOW 
reflects the results of market research, and impacts all other steps of the contracting 
process. During this step, proposal evaluation factors are developed to communicate 
program priorities in general order of importance. Some examples of proposal evaluation 
factors include: technical performance, past performance, cost, supportability, 
producibility, and management approach. The requirements of the SOW will be related to 
the source selection strategy, whether it is LPTA or Tradeoff. The solicitation planning 
step output is the solicitation, which is in the form of an RFP or IFB. If the source 
selection strategy selected is anything other than LPTA, then the solicitation must be in 
the form of an RFP, as IFBs do not allow for anything other than LPTA and also do not 
allow for any type of communication with the bidders during the source selection process 
(FAR, 2014, Part 14.101). The solicitation will include the SOW and any other clarifying 
documentation such as instructions to offerors regarding how to complete and submit 
their proposal. When considering source selection strategy, Section M of the solicitation 
is the key section that dictates how the proposals will be evaluated and what the 
evaluation criteria will be, whether an LPTA or Tradeoff approach will be used (FAR, 
2014, Part 15.304e). Section M identifies all significant evaluation factors that will be 
considered in evaluating proposals and their relative importance. When evaluation factors 
other than cost/price are used, the solicitation must state if the evaluation factors are 
significantly more, approximately equal, or significantly less important than cost/price. A 
solicitation can have Tradeoff factors that are more advantageous to the federal 
government and still award to the offeror with the lowest bid submitted. With all of the 
information derived from solicitation planning step, procurement documents can be 
developed. 
(3) Step 3: Solicitation  
The solicitation process “consists of obtaining information (bids and proposals) 
from prospective sellers on how project needs can be met” (Garrett, 2010, p. 90). In the 
previous step, bidders would have been identified, and a qualified bidders list would be 
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generated. It is important to ensure that all bidders have a clear understanding of what the 
government is requesting in the RFP. In many solicitations, the government will advertise 
through the government-wide point of entry (GPE), “the single point where government 
business opportunities” which exceed $25,000, including synopses of proposed contract 
actions, solicitations, and associated information, can be accessed electronically by the 
public” (FAR, 2014, Part 2.101). The GPE is located at www.fedbizops.gov. The 
resulting formal bids should be submitted by responsible sources (FAR, 2014, Part 
9.103). 
2. Award Phase 
During the award phase, the government chooses which perspective contractor 
will receive the contract award. Both the government and contractor may participate in 
contract negotiations, in which terms and conditions are agreed upon to ensure both 
parties achieve their goals, to include cost, schedule, performance, and any other 
requirement of the contract. 
(4) Step 4: Source Selection  
The source selection process “entails receiving bids or proposals and applying 
evaluation criteria to select a provider” (Garrett, 2010, p. 137). There are different 
approaches to handle the source selection process based on the type of procurement. If it 
is sealed bid procurement, then the bid evaluation is a very structured process. As long as 
the bid conforms to what is in Section M, then price is the only factor considered. For 
negotiated contracts, evaluation criteria would have been established in the solicitation 
planning step. The criterion needs to ensure the greatest potential for successful 
performance or cost effectiveness for the government. Best value depends upon “sound 
selection strategies that ensure that the outlined project procurement objectives, including 
client/user demands are met” (Palaneeswaran, Kumaraswamy, & Ng, 2003). The best 
value continuum states, “An agency can obtain best value in negotiated acquisitions by 
using any one or a combination of source selection approaches. In different types of 
acquisitions, the relative importance of cost or price may vary” (FAR, 2014, Part 15.101). 
An example of an acquisition where price may not be as important is an item that is well 
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defined and has relatively low performance risk, like furniture or tires. These items could 
have cost/price as the deciding factor. An item like a new radar system for an AEGIS-
class destroyer requires much more technical development and is far harder to adequately 
define. In this type of acquisition, factors like past performance and technical 
performance might be more important than cost. Clearly, the choice of using either the 
LPTA or Tradeoff strategy plays a role in the government’s ability to choose the offeror 
that presents the “best value.” Figure 2 illustrates the relative importance of cost/price 
factors and non-cost/non-price factors for each source selection strategy.   
 
Figure 2.  Best Value Continuum (from GAO, 2010) 
In LPTA, an established acceptability standard is set for technical requirements, 
and that is what all bidders must meet. The contract is awarded to the bidder who meets 
that standard (a standard considered technically acceptable) and has the lowest price. 
Tradeoff selections occur when the contracting officer believes that the offer gives the 
government an advantage somewhere else on the best value continuum that is not strictly 
based on cost/price, though cost is always a factor.  
3. Post-award Phase 
The post-award phase includes events that take place once the contract has been 
awarded through its completion, whether that is by completion or termination. No two 
contracts are alike in how they are administered once a contract is awarded; contract 
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administration can be direct and simple or quite complex. The key is in monitoring and 
evaluating the contractor to ensure that the terms and conditions of the contract are being 
met. Contract closeout entails taking care of the final details of the contract so it can be 
closed out.    
(5) Step 5: Contract Administration 
The contract administration step begins once the contract is awarded; it is “the 
process of ensuring that each party’s performance meets contractual requirements” 
(Garrett, 2010, p. 162). Much of the documentation and information developed and 
determined early in the solicitation planning step, such as the SOW, terms and conditions, 
and schedule are executed during this step. The contract itself is a crucial piece to guide 
the effort. Oftentimes changes or modifications are necessary when dealing with 
government contracts; these take place during the contract administration step. There are 
two types of modifications listed in the FAR. A bilateral change is something that 
requires the agreement of both parties and typically includes a change that requires some 
sort of equitable adjustment (i.e., agreed-upon changes to contract price, schedule, etc.). 
Unilateral changes only require the contracting officer’s approval and are typically used 
for administrative issues (e.g., changes in accounting lines, payment processes, etc.). The 
contract administration step is where the contractor is actually doing what the 
government is paying for, so it is imperative that the contractor’s work is monitored to 
ensure that what was determined in the source selection strategy, whether it was an 
established acceptable standard or the highest technical performance, is being met. There 
are several means to monitor the contractor’s performance. The government may use 
quality assurance evaluators (QAE) or contracting officer’s technical representatives 
(COTR) to ensure the contractor is providing materials or services at an acceptable 
standard. These individuals provide the contracting officer with information to ensure the 
contractor is meeting the requirements of the SOW and other contractual requirements. 
Another way to measure the contractor’s performance is thru earned value management 
(EVM). EVM measures a project’s cost, schedule and performance progress by 
comparing the actual figures with planned estimates. Performance is measured by taking 
the budgeted cost of work performed and comparing it to the actual costs of the work 
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performed (Rendon & Snider, 2008). Withholding contractor payments can also be used 
if performance is lacking, but this should not be done unless all other means have been 
exhausted and not without following all applicable guidelines.    
(6) Step 6: Contract Closeout and Termination  
Contract closeout and termination is the final step for any contract and can go in 
three different ways: successful performance, termination for convenience (T4C), or 
termination for default (T4D). A successful contract closeout is how the majority of 
contracts conclude. This occurs when the contractor has completed all assigned tasks and 
they are accepted by the buyer (Garrett, 2010, p. 185). This means that all items or 
services on the contract have been received and/or met and the contractor has received 
final payment. Upon receipt of the contract completion statement, the contracting officer 
initiates the contract closeout process in accordance with FAR Part 4.804 (Rendon & 
Snider, 2008, p. 180).   
Contracts that are not completed are closed out through termination, either for 
convenience or for default. T4C happens when the government exercises its unique right 
to terminate either partially or completely any contract unilaterally. This process must be 
in writing, and there is no requirement for justification. The contractor is entitled to 
termination costs associated with the contract, which may include compensation for work 
done and allowance for profit (FAR, 2014, Part 49.2). T4D occurs when the government 
exercises its right to terminate a contact either “partially or completely due to the 
contractor’s actual or anticipated failure to perform contractual obligations” (FAR, 2014, 
Part 49.401). Any contractor who receives a T4D may be liable to the government for 
any funds received, regardless of work performed, and any excess costs due to 
procurement. The contractor may also be liable for procurement costs, should the 
government need to award a contract to a different contractor to complete the required 
work. A T4D can also affect the contractors past performance evaluation for future 
contracts. It is during the contract closeout step in which the government conducts an 
assessment of the contractors performance using the Contract Performance Assessment 
Reporting System (CPARS) and Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS) 
to ensure past performance information is submitted properly and within an appropriate 
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time (FAR, 2014, Part 42.1501). As previously discussed, the source selection step is 
where bids or proposals are received based on evaluation criteria, the next section will 
discuss in more detail the two types of source selection strategies. 
C. SOURCE SELECTION STRATEGY 
Source selection strategies consist of LPTA as well as Tradeoff. The following 
discussion provides additional detail for each of these strategies.   
1. Lowest Price Technically Acceptable 
Contracting officers use the LPTA source selection strategy when “best value is 
expected to result from selection of the technically acceptable proposal with the lowest 
evaluated price” (FAR, 2014, Part 15.101-2). When using LPTA as a source selection 
strategy, the solicitation determines evaluation factors and significant subfactors that 
establish the requirements of acceptability. Solicitations specify “the award will be made 
on the basis of the lowest evaluated price of proposals meeting or exceeding the 
acceptability standards for non-cost factors” (FAR, 2014, Part 15.101-2). Contracting 
officerss are not allowed to use of tradeoffs in LPTA actions. Non-cost/price factors are 
not used during evaluation for acceptability (FAR, 2014, Part 15.101-2). This means that 
once the government determines an acceptable minimum standard, it can still look at 
other factors, but cannot use any of them as a deciding factor for making its decision as to 
who will receive the contract. Once technical acceptability is established, the only 
relevant factor is cost/price. LPTA is typically used for contracts that have low 
performance risk and well-defined requirements (FAR, 2014, Part 15.101).   
2. Tradeoff 
Contracting officers use the Tradeoff source selection strategy when it is expected 
that the best value can be received from other than the lowest priced offeror or other than 
the highest technically rated offeror. According to the FAR any items that may affect the 
contract award for a Tradeoff, evaluation factors and significant subfactors, must be 
clearly stated in the solicitation with their relative importance. The solicitation states 
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whether all evaluation factors other than cost or price, “when combined, are significantly 
more important than, approximately equal to, or significantly less important than cost or 
price” (FAR, 2014, Part 15.101). Through this process, the government may choose a 
proposal that is other than the lowest price. “The perceived benefits of the higher priced 
proposal shall merit the additional cost, and the rationale for Tradeoffs must be 
documented” (FAR, 2014, Part 15.101-1). This means that if the source selection team 
determines that factors other than price will provide a better value to the government, 
then the contracting officer may use those as the primary factors when awarding the 
contract. Contracting officers must always remember that they have a responsibility to 
the tax payers and ensure that the factors provide the best value. In a situation where 
technical performance is weighted higher than cost/price, an offeror that is the highest 
technically rated may still lose the contract to a lower priced bid if that offeror is deemed 
to be economically out of range relative to other closely matched technical offerors. The 
government, even in a Tradeoff strategy, may award to the lowest price offeror that meets 
the technical requirements. Even though the source selection strategy is based on a 
Tradeoff, the contracting officer must still explain why the winning bid won (i.e., provide 
a rationale for award) if it was higher priced than other bids. This is easily done if the 
winning contractor is far superior technically and close in price, but if the technical 
performance is close and the price has a large disparity, this may cause issues, including a 
protest from a lower bidder. A few key factors to ensure a successful use of a Tradeoff 
source selection are training team members involved and a clear source selection plan. It 
is imperative to have a motivated and technically talented team led by a strong leader that 
understands the objectives of the contract.   The team needs a well-published schedule, 
and must have open dialogue and respect between all team members (Wydler, 2010). The 
previous discussion covered the specifics of the source selection process and the two 
source selection strategies, LPTA and Tradeoff; the next section will identify some 




D. INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS 
Since 1992, GAO has classified DOD’s contract management as a high risk. The 
challenges DOD faces according to GAO are: an insufficient acquisition workforce, 
ineffective contracting techniques and approaches, less established procedures for service 
acquisitions, and operational contract support. Of the areas of concern highlighted by the 
report, the area most directly related to the source selection process is the contracting 
techniques and approaches. According to GAO, DOD has struggled with utilizing the 
most effective contract type and the effective use of competition (GAO, 2015). 
Consequently, Congress has shown an increased focus on the use of best value processes 
in the DOD acquisition process. Through Section 845 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2010, Congress mandated the GAO to review 
the “DOD’s use of the best value Tradeoff process, specifically when non-cost factors 
were more important than price” (National Defense Authorization Act, 2010). The GAO 
looked at fiscal year 2009 contracts with a minimum dollar value of $25 million due to 
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) requirement of 
contracts with a value of $25 million or more in a fiscal year to have a written acquisition 
plan (DFARS 207.103). The GAO’s research looked at (a) how often and for what types 
of contracts the DOD used the best value Tradeoff process; (b) why and how the DOD 
used such an approach; and (c) challenges, if any, the DOD faced in using the best value 
Tradeoff process (GAO, 2010). The GAO found that the DOD used best value processes 
(LPTA or Tradeoff) in 95% of the competitively awarded contracts it reviewed. Figure 3 
shows the different source selection strategies the GAO found in its research and the 
percentage breakdown between cost and non-cost factors. In 69% of awarded contracts, 
Tradeoff was the source selection strategy used. 
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Figure 3.  Selection Strategy Percentages (from GAO, 2010, p. 7) 
When the DOD ranked Tradeoff (non-cost factors more important than price), the 
typical factors were (not necessarily in this order) past performance, technical, small 
business, experience, and management. The GAO found that in Tradeoff source 
selections, the DOD selected a lower priced proposal almost as often as it selected the 
non-lowest cost proposal. In the situations in which the DOD chose an offer without the 
lowest cost, on average, the cost differential was less than 5 percent. There were 
situations where the cost differential was much higher, as in the Marine Corps paying 
48% more than the next lower bidder for burn-resistant clothing for soldiers in Iraq. In 
that situation, the benefit of greater second- and third-degree burn protection outweighed 
the next offeror’s proposal (GAO, 2010, p. 15). The DOD did state that when using 
Tradeoff as a source selection strategy, there were certain challenges that may arise that 
were not as prevalent in the LPTA strategy, such as difficulties in developing meaningful 
evaluation factors, additional time investment, and the level of business judgment 
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required. Instances arose where contracting personnel awarded a contract based on 
Tradeoff procedures, but failed to adequately evaluate the factors. The Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command (NAVFAC) was investigated by the Department of Defense 
Inspector General (DODIG) over a contract that in the end revealed the correct 
prospective contractor won the bid, but there were issues in the technical evaluation and 
missed past performance factors (DODIG, 2006). The Marine Corps experienced a 
similar situation where evaluation criteria in solicitations lacked adequate documentation 
and the disclosure of technical data. (DODIG, 2009). These difficulties are exasperated 
by the knowledge that many seasoned and experienced acquisition professionals are 
retiring and the DOD expects to increase its contracting career field by 6,400 personnel 
by fiscal year 2015 (GAO, 2010, p. 18).   
The GAO concluded that in fiscal year 2009, best value Tradeoff accounted for 
the majority of competitive contract awards, and using the process effectively depends on 
making sound Tradeoffs between price and non-cost factors. It recommended the DOD 
develop a training plan to help contracting professionals determine when the price 
differential is warranted in making Tradeoff award decisions. The DOD concurred with 
this assessment (GAO, 2010, p. 26). 
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2014 again mandated that the GAO 
review the DOD’s use of best value contract award processes. This time the GAO looked 
at contracts with obligations over $1 million, the DOD and military departments’ 
guidance on use of best value, and training provided to acquisition professionals from the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and military departments. The GAO found that, 
again, Tradeoff was used in the majority of contracts. LPTA was used most often for 
higher dollar obligations to acquire commercial products and for lower dollar obligations 
to acquire both products and services. From 2009 to 2013, the use of LPTA increased by 
9% in contracts over $25 million (GAO, 2014, p. 10). Figure 4 shows the changes 
between the two GAO reports. The DOD’s increased ability to appropriately define its 
requirements and its knowledge of potential contractors, through market research, were 
key factors in determining when to use Tradeoff or LPTA.   
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Table 1.   GAO Analysis of DOD Solicitation Documents 
(from GAO, 2014, p. 12) 
 
 
Declining budgets also increased the use of LPTA source selection strategy 
(GAO, 2014, p. 12). The GAO found that the DAU and military departments provide 
classroom and online training related to source selection, though it is stressed by both that 
on-the-job training is key for acquisition personnel to make informed source selection 
decisions. Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy officials are also working on 
updating the DOD’s source selection procedures to further define how to conduct best 
value source selections (GAO, 2014, p. 16).   
Though the two GAO reports showed that Tradeoff is chosen significantly more 
than LPTA, there are many in the defense industry who see the LPTA strategy as the 
DOD attempting to meet their requirements in the least expensive manner, and, as a 
result, the warfighter suffers. Ed Spitler, president of Astrium Services Government Inc., 
a part of the Airbus Group, said “the U.S. military’s ‘lowest price, technically acceptable’ 
procurement strategy is stifling innovation and ultimately shortchanging war fighters” 
(Magnuson, 2014). He also said, “You may have written the best proposal of your life ... 
but it will never be read by the government because of that LPTA requirement. It’s a 
shame because there is no room for innovation when you do that.” Mr. Spitler says he has 
asked procurement officials how they can give contracts to such small, inexperienced 
firms, and their attitude is: “If they fail or default in year one, we just recompete it” 
(Magnuson, 2014). In another article, Bob Lohfeld of the Lohfeld Consulting Group 
explained how in an LPTA contract award; factors other than price cannot be used in the 
evaluation if the product is deemed technically acceptable. This means that when 
applying LPTA criteria to past performance evaluations, an “offeror without a record of 
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relevant past performance or for whom information on past performance is not available 
or is so sparse that no meaningful past performance rating can be reasonably assigned; 
the offeror may not be evaluated favorably or unfavorably on past performance” (FAR, 
2014, Part 15.305). Therefore, the offeror shall be determined to have unknown past 
performance. In the context of acceptability/unacceptability, unknown shall be 
considered acceptable (Lohfeld, 2012). 
John Coombs, former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics 
and Technology, wrote that the way to get LPTA right is by raising the bar for technical 
acceptability. He wrote that in an LPTA awarded contract, prospective contractors 
receive nothing for having more qualified personnel. If all have met the technically 
acceptable standard, those personnel will cost more and mean someone else may have the 
lowest price. By setting the technically acceptable skill level in the requirement, that 
becomes the minimum skill required for the contractor (Coombs, 2013). This can help 
achieve a technical acceptance that is based more on the non-cost/non-price factors than 
just the price of the bids received.    
Jacques S. Gansler, former undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, 
and logistics, and William Lucyshyn, researched the DOD’s use of LPTA as a source 
selection strategy. They found it was imperative for government acquisition professionals 
to leverage LPTA effectively and appropriately to find cost savings with anticipated 
declining budgets. They warned that LPTA overuse could have drawbacks; lack of 
innovation by contractors, impact on quality, and lowered investment on human capital. 
Gansler and Lucyshyn also provided some recommendations on ways to improve the use 
of LPTA source selection, without stifling innovation and risking project completion. 
Only use LPTA when “technically acceptable” can be fully defined and the risk is low. 
Past performance should be used as an evaluation factor in the LPTA process, especially 
when acquiring complex mission support services. LPTA should be used when items can 
be clearly defined, but the risk of over using LPTA to save money could have effects on 
what the warfighter receives in quality, reduced industry innovation, and reduced 
schedule and delivery accuracy. The quality of government and prospective contractor 
communications needs to be improved. Unequal communications, or the lack of 
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communications, can lead to bid protests and misunderstandings of the government’s 
showneeds. The last recommendation the two make is for the government to invest in the 
acquisition work force. In situations where LPTA use was criticized, it is sometimes 
unclear whether the LPTA source selection strategy itself was to blame, or if the problem 
rests with the government’s inability to sufficiently identify and articulate the minimum 
requirements.  Source selection requires a highly trained workforce to determine if 
LPTA is the appropriate strategy (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2013).  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an overview of the contract management process and the 
associated literature. The chapter began with the basics of contract management and also 
showed statues and regulations associated with it. We then discussed the three phases of 
contract management as well as the six steps of the contract management process, 
highlighting how each had an effect on the source selection strategy. We then focused on 
the two source selection strategies and their differences. The next chapter provides a 
discussion of the major Navy acquisition commands, NAVAIR and NAVSEA, and why 
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III. NAVAL SYSTEMS COMMANDS 
This chapter provides an overview of the DOD and Navy acquisition 
organizations and the two major Naval Systems Commands: NAVAIR and NAVSEA. 
The research provides information on the commands’ organization, missions, and 
contracting departments.  
A. DOD ACQUISITION ORGANIZATION 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD 
[AT&L]) is the principal staff assistant (PSA) to the Secretary and Deputy of Defense for 
all matters relating to the DOD acquisition system (USD [AT&L], 2014). A primary 
function of USD (AT&L) is to produce the DOD directive 5000.01. DOD directive 
5000.01 is the principle directive on defense acquisition and provides policy and 
guidance for all DOD acquisition programs. The primary mission of Defense Acquisition 
is to produce quality and cost efficient products that satisfy user needs to accomplish the 
mission. There are five major policy objectives of Defense acquisition: promotion of 
competition; realistic cost projections; affordability, the reality of fiscal constrains; 
knowledge-based acquisition to include the reduction of manufacturing risk and 
demonstration of producibility; and application of a systems engineering process 
(Acquisition Community Connection, 2014). Figure 4 demonstrates that the DOD 
acquisition organization is a multi-tier management structure. Below the USD (AT&L) 
are the service acquisition executives (SAE), who oversee the program executive offices 
(PEO). PEO consists of the program management offices, which are headed by program 
managers (PM) and include other members of the acquisition team. The Navy’s 






Figure 4.   USD (AT&L) Acquisition Community Connection (from 
Acquisition Community Connection, 2014) 
B. NAVY ACQUISITION ORGANIZATION 
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN) for research, development and 
acquisition (RDA) manages the Navy acquisition organization. ASN (RDA) is 
responsible for: representation before AT&L and Congress regarding policies and 
programs; development of Marine Corps and Navy weapons systems; and acquisition for 
entire functions and programs. Different layers within the Navy’s organization taskforce 
execute its mission: ASN; PEOs; direct reporting program managers (DRPMs); the naval 
systems commands; and their field activities. Each layer carries out its own 
responsibilities. For example, PEOs and DRPMs overlook different systems commands 
(SYSCOMs) such as Naval Sea Systems, Naval Air Systems, Space and Naval Warfare, 
and Naval Supply Systems. The SYSCOMs primarily support NAVY with material and 
they report to ASN (Acquisition Community Connection, 2014).  




Figure 5.  Navy Organization Chart for Research, Development, and Acquisition (from ASN [RDA], 2014) 
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C. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF THE NAVY ACQUISITION 
AND PROCUREMENT  
As shown in Figure 5, SYSCOM commanders such as NAVAIR and NAVSEA 
fall under ASN (RDA); similarly, Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the Navy (Acquisition 
and Procurement) (DASN [AP]) falls under ASN (RDA). DASN (AP) provides policy 
and procedures for the Navy’s world-wide acquisition system. As stated on the website, 
DASN (AP)’s mission is “to shape acquisition and logistics policies that assure sailors 
and marines are mission capable, and have a technological edge over adversaries.” DASN 
(AP) has four primary goals, to advise ASN (RDA), serve as DON Competition 
Advocate General, establish acquisition and logistics policy, and improve the acquisition 
systems (DASN AP, 2015). 
D. NAVSEA ORGANIZATION 
NAVSEA is the DON’s primary shipbuilding agency. According to NAVSEA’s 
official website (2014), its mission is to “design, build, deliver, and maintain ships and 
systems on time and on budget.” Their organization consists of command staff and 
affiliated PEOs including: Ships, Littoral Combat Ships, Submarines, Carriers and 
Integrated Warfare Systems as seen in Figure 6. NAVSEA manages the life-cycle of an 
acquisition programs from planning to retirement. Their staff consists of 60,000 civilians, 
military and contractors. Compared to other five SYSCOMs, NAVSEA has the highest 
yearly budget of $30 billion. NAVSEA handles 150 acquisitions programs, and oversees 
billions of dollars in foreign military sales (NAVSEA, 2014). NAVSEA operates in 16 
states with 33 activities and plays a major role in the NAVY Enterprise that is responsible 
of guiding resource sponsors that regulates technical standards for combat systems 
(NAVSEA, 2014). NAVSEA’s affiliated PEOs are: 
• PEO for Ships 
• PEO for Littoral Ships  
• PEO for Submarines 
• PEO for Integrated Warfare Systems 
(NAVSEA, 2014)  
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Figure 6.  NAVSEA Corporate Leadership 2014 (from NAVSEA, 2014) 
As per NAVSEA, they locates many of its field activities in different parts of the 
country in order to assist its numerous customers, such as the fleet and DOD, providing 
products and support, along with engineering, scientific, technical, and logistical 
expertise. Figure 7 illustrates, the headquarters of NAVSEA is located in the Washington, 
DC, Navy Yard. NAVSEA’s four shipyards include Norfolk Naval Shipyard in 
Portsmouth, Virginia; Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance 
Facility (IMF) in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, 
Maine; and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and IMF in Bremerton, Washington. NAVSEA 
has two warfare centers: the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) and the Naval 
Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC). The warfare centers play an important role in 
supplying various support and services to satisfy customer requirements. The support and 
services include technical operations, people, technology, engineering, and products. 
They are considered key players in analyzing and assessing the various ship and 
submarine systems. These include combat systems, ordnance, mines, and strategic 




Figure 7.  NAVSEA Field Activities (from NAVSEA, 2014) 
SEA 02, the contracting office for NAVSEA, processes almost $24 billion in 
contracts every year. SEA 02 typically awards contracts for new procurement for 
construction; repair of ships and submarines; major weapon systems and other types of 
maintenance. The procurement process includes developing and planning acquisition 
strategies. SEA 02 uses different procurement methods to fulfill the warfighters needs 
such as: solicitation, negotiation and award of contracts; as well as administration of 
contract performance (NAVSEA, 2014). 
NAVSEA states that SEA 02 has contracts for the following requirements: 
• Ships, shipboard weapons, and combat systems 
• Design and integration 
• Maintenance and repair 
• Modernization and conversion 
• Technical, industrial and logistics supports 





As shown in Figure 8, SEA 02 is has five divisions. First, SEA 022 is the 
shipbuilding division that deals with four types of contracts such as Cost-Plus Fixed Fee 
(CPFF), Cost-Plus Award Fee (CPAF), and Cost-Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract 
types. Second, SEA 024 is the ship repair division that primarily uses CPFF contracts. 
Third, SEA 025 is the surface systems division that primarily uses Firm Fixed Priced 
(FFP) two types of contracts such as Fixed-Plus Incentive Firm (FPIF) contracts. Fourth, 
SEA 026 is the submarine systems division that procures hardware and uses FFP and 
FPIF contracts (Graham, Lewis, & Wallace, 2010). 
 
Figure 8.  Organizational Chart of Contract Sea 02 (from Graham et al., 2010) 
E. NAVAIR ORGANIZATION 
Headquartered in Patuxent River, Maryland, NAVAIR was established in 1966 
and is the primary agency responsible for the development and procurement of Navy and 
Marine Corps aviation assets (NAVAIR, 2014). According to the website, NAVAIR’s 
mission is “to provide full life-cycle support of naval aircraft, weapons, and systems 
operated by sailors and marines” into eight functional areas, they are: “research, design, 
development and systems engineering; acquisition; test and evaluation; training facilities 
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and equipment; repair and modification; in-service engineering and logistics support” 
(NAVAIR, 2014). 
Structurally, NAVAIR is also organized into eight communities of practice (CoP) 
such as: “program management, contracts, research and engineering, test and evaluation, 
logistics and industrial operations, corporate operations, comptroller and counsel” 
(NAVAIR, 2014). The primary recipients of NAVAIR’s support are the Program 
Executive Officers (PEOS) and the program managers (PMs) who manage the acquisition 
“program’s cost, schedule, and performance requirements.” Typically this support takes 
the form of a combination of the following: “people, processes, tools, training, mission 
facilities, and core technologies” (NAVAIR, 2014).   
As per NAVAIR, there are four affiliated PEOs are: 
• PEO for Tactical Aircraft Programs: PEO (T) 
• PEO for Air Anti Surface Warfare (ASW), Assault and Special Mission 
Programs: PEO (A) 
• PEO for Unmanned Aviation and Strike Weapons: PEO (U&W) 
• PEO for Joint Strike Fighter: PEO (JSF; which alternates service lead with 
the Air Force)  
(NAVAIR 2014) 
As shown in Figure 9, NAVAIR has eight core competencies: Program 
Management (AIR 1.0), Contracts (AIR 2.0), Research & Engineering (AIR 4.0), Test & 
Evaluation (AIR 5.0), Logistics & Industrial Operations (AIR 6.0), Corporate Operations 




Figure 9.   NAVAIR Organization Chart (from NAVAIR, 2014) 
Figure 10 shows NAVAIR’s major sites. China Lake and Point Mugu comprise 
the weapons division. Lake Hurst, Cherry Point, and Patuxent River comprise the aircraft 














Figure 10.  NAVAIR Major Sites (from NAVAIR, 2014) 
NAVAIR 2.0 is “accountable for contracting supplies, services, and material 
requirements of Integrated Program Teams (IPT), Program Support Teams (PST), and 
Enterprise Teams” (ET; NAVAIR, 2014). As shown in Figure 11, NAVAIR 2.0 has six 









Figure 11.  NAVAIR 2.0 Organization Chart (from NAVAIR, 2014) 
F. WHY NAVAIR AND NAVSEA FOR THIS RESEARCH? 
NAVAIR and NAVSEA, two major SYSCOMs, were chosen for this research 
project because they have the largest procurement organizations in the Navy that procure 
not only simple goods and services but also complex systems. These two commands 
conduct multiple contracting source selections, which consist of sufficient mixture of 
LPTA and the Tradeoff source selection strategies to answer our research questions.  
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of the DOD acquisition organization and 
primarily focused on the Navy’s organization of acquisition activities. The chapter also 
included a discussion of the two major systems commands, NAVAIR and NAVSEA 
specifically their organization, mission, and contracting divisions. The next chapter 
discusses how data was accessed, the statistical analysis of that data, the findings of the 
analysis, implication and results, and areas for further research.  
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IV. ANALYSIS  
In this chapter, we discuss the research methodology and analysis conducted to 
answer the research questions presented in Chapter I. Specifically, we discuss the source 
of the data, the data collection method, and how the data were analyzed. We also include 
a description of the spreadsheet we used and the type of data collected.  
A. OVERVIEW OF THE DATA 
The purpose of this research is to explore potential relationship between the 
source selection strategy (LPTA or Tradeoff) and resultant contract outcomes; thus 
NAVAIR and NAVSEA provided us the best option within the Navy to collect data that 
captures the entire contracting management process. As the Navy’s two largest 
SYSCOMs, NAVAIR and NAVSEA have a combined fiscal year 2015 budget of $53 
billion (NAVAIR & NAVSEA, 2014). Given their wide acquisition authority, they are 
ideal sources of data for our research, namely, completed contracts.  
1. Data Source 
To collect the data needed, we manually reviewed hard copies of completed 
contracts at NAVAIR and NAVSEA’s contract file repositories. All three members of the 
research team traveled to NAVAIR and NAVSEA and spent two days reviewing contract 
files at each location. To capture the data, we used a spreadsheet developed by our 
advisors, Professors Rene Rendon and Karen Landale. The spreadsheet was designed to 
capture all the relevant details of a procurement that might affect contract outcomes. To 
maximize our efficiency, we sent advance copies of our spreadsheet to each command 
and asked for assistance locating relevant contract files. Both commands were quite 
accommodating to our request for access to their contract files, and each provided a 
workstation and a representative to assist us with locating files. 
Upon arriving at NAVAIR, our first stop, we were overwhelmed by the volumes 
of contracts files that lined the shelves. Our initial assessment of each file room was that 
we would have no trouble collecting a large sample of the contract data. Unfortunately, 
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individual contract files proved to be much larger and more complex than we had 
anticipated and far more difficult to mine for the pertinent data fields. While each 
command employs the use of a contract file checklist that contained the elements of FAR 
4.803, we observed that about a third of the contracts we reviewed did not follow it as 
prescribed. Some contract files seemed to only include the essential documents while 
others tended to include a lot of extra data resulting in contract files spanning multiple 
volumes. We found that the condition of file room and contract files at NAVSEA to be 
quite similar to those at NAVAIR.  
2. Data Description 
The spreadsheet we used to collect our data was designed to capture information 
from all six steps of the contract management process. The spreadsheet is divided into 
five overarching categories that seek to provide a comprehensive overview of each 
contract: (1) basic contract information, (2) acquisition complexity, (3) environmental 
factors, (4) outcomes variables and (5) other relevant contract information. The basic 
information section captures identifying features of the contract such as contract number, 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code, and Product or Service 
Code (PSC). The acquisition complexity section captures data from both the solicitation 
and award phases. Some of the high points of this section include contract type, whether 
the contract is a small business set aside, the dollar value of the requirement, award fee 
criteria and incentives (as applicable). The environmental factors section addresses the 
evaluation phase and focuses primarily on the actions of the source selection team. The 
outcome variables address some pre-award and post-award factors (e.g., they include the 
number of solicitation amendments, PALT and performance rating data). Finally, the 
other relevant contract section addresses contracting officer communiqué (e.g., evaluation 
notices, clarification request and award notices). For a more in-depth look at the 
spreadsheet, please refer to the appendix.   
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B. DATA ANALYSIS  
In this section, we describe our data, provide insight into our dataset, and discuss 
the methodology used to analyze the data.  
1. Data Description 
For this analysis, we have two dependent, or outcome, variables (DVs): 
procurement administrative lead-time (PALT) and Contractor Performance Assessment 
Rating System (CPARS) data. PALT assesses “time to contract” by calculating the 
number of days between receipt of the requisition and contract award. It is a continuous 
variable. CPARS serves as a proxy measure of contract success or failure by using the 
ratings given to each contract once complete. CPARS ratings are given in Likert-style 
responses where 1=Unsatisfactory, 2=Marginal, 3=Satisfactory, 4=Very Good, and 
5=Excellent. In this case, we calculated the overall CPARS score by averaging the 
following CPARS factors:  quality, schedule, management of key personnel, and small 
business use. While it is preferable to use each CPARS rating as an individual aspect of 
contract success (i.e., allow each CPARS rating to be a measurable contract outcome), 
our sample size was not large enough, nor were our cases complete enough, to perform 
such analyses. Hence, the average score was used.   
We have one independent variable, or IV. Independent variables are those that can 
be manipulated by the researcher (or user) and evoke a change in the outcome, or DV. 
Our IV concerns the contract methodology used for the contract: LPTA or Tradeoff. 
Contracting source selection strategy is a choice made by the “user” (the integrated 
product team, which includes the Contracting Officer), hence it is considered an IV. Our 
IV is labeled LPTATO and it is a binary variable where 0=LPTA and 1=Tradeoff. 
Finally, we have one covariate variable. Covariates are secondary variables that 
can also affect the relationship of primary interest: the relationship between the IV and 
the DV. In particular, covariates are variables other than the IV that may substantially 
affect the DV. Our covariate is contract dollar value (VALUE) and it is a continuous 
variable. The dollar value of a contract affects the number of reviews it has to go through, 
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thus affecting the PALT. Higher dollar contracts typically have a more robust review 
process, and thus longer PALTs. The opposite is typically true for lower dollar value 
contracts. In this case, we hope to parcel out the effect of the covariate VALUE in order 
to more clearly see the effect the contracting methodology (LPTATO) has on the 
outcome variables (PALT and CPARS).  
3. Descriptive Statistics 
Basic descriptive statistics for each variable are shown in Table 2.2 The table 
presents three figures for each variable: (1) the total for all the data, (2) the total for 
LPTA contracts and (3) the total for Tradeoff contracts.   
Table 2.   Data Breakdown 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
PALT 
(days) 
36 398.17 265.80 3 953 
6 170.67 225.96 3 623 
30 443.67 252.21 112 953 
CPARS 
(rating) 
20 4.04 .97 2 5 
2 3.13 .18 3 3.25 
18 4.14 .97 2 5 
VALUE 
(dollars) 
38 $65,300,000 $105,000,000 $238,410 $450,000,000 
7 $67,200,000 $169,000,000 $238,410 $450,000,000 
31 $64,800,000 $88,800,000 $1,199,776 $353,000,000 
*Bold=total for all data, non-italicized=LPTA, italicized=Tradeoff 
 
 
                                                 
2 One outlying observation was deleted from the dataset. Analyses were performed both before and 
after deletion. The outlying observation did not affect overall significance of the results, however because 
the graphics were clearer without the observation, it was removed. All results presented in this paper 
exclude the outlying observation. 
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4. Data Issues 
With 36 cases, our sample size is somewhat small. Power calculations suggest the 
need for 14 cases of each contracting source selection strategy (i.e., 14 LPTA cases and 
14 Tradeoff cases) in order to achieve adequate power (α = .05, β = .80). Our data is 
unbalanced with respect to the number of cases for each contracting source selection 
strategy. There are 6 LPTA cases and 30 Tradeoff cases. This unbalanced design can 
cause ambiguity about the mean as the intercept and make assignment of sums of squares 
more difficult. There are, however, solutions to these issues. A weighted mean can be 
used in place of the grand mean3 and the STATA software automatically handles the 
assignment of the sums of squares. Thus, we proceeded with our analysis despite these 
issues.  
5. Analysis 
Because our intent is to analyze differences in contract outcomes (PALT and 
CPARS) based on contracting methodology (LPTA or Tradeoff), a group comparison 
statistical methodology is necessary. In other words, the contracting source selection 
strategies are divided into two groups (LPTA and Tradeoff), and we seek to find if there 
are differences in contract outcomes (PALT and CPARS) by group.   
We initially used a technique called multivariate analysis of covariance, or 
MANCOVA, to assess group differences. The results showed that there were no 
differences in contract outcomes based on the contracting methodology used. Regardless 
of whether the acquisition team chose a LPTA or Tradeoff source selection strategy, the 
lead-time required to put the requirement on contract (PALT) and the success of the 
contract (as measured by CPARS ratings) did not vary (i.e., were not significantly 
different). We suspected that the results may be different if we examined just one 
contract outcome at a time, thus post-hoc analyses were performed in which PALT and 
CPARS were analyzed separately. Because we were now assessing the outcome variables 
                                                 
3 The grand mean would be the intercept in a balanced design. 
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individually, the methodology changed from a multivariate test (MANCOVA) to a 
univariate test, known simply as analysis of covariance, or ANCOVA.   
ANCOVA addresses the following questions: 
• Are mean differences among the groups (after adjusting for covariate 
effects) likely to have occurred by chance? 
• Taken from another angle, is there a significant difference between the 
mean value for PALT in the LPTA acquisitions versus the mean value for 
PALT in the Tradeoff acquisitions once the effect of the covariate 
(VALUE) has been parceled out? 
ANCOVA examines the relationships between the dependent variables (PALT 
and CPARS) and the independent variable (choice of LPTA or Tradeoff strategy) while 
taking into account the effect the covariate (VALUE) might have on the outcome 
variables (PALT and CPARS).   
6. Assumption Testing 
Before conducting the ANCOVA, certain assumptions about the data were tested. 
First, we assessed univariate normality by performing the Shapiro-Wilk test. Both PALT 
and contract value (VALUE) were deemed to be non-normal. PALT was normalized via 
a square root transformation, while a logarithmic transformation was performed on 
VALUE. Both variables passed the Shapiro-Wilk normality test once transformed. 
Second, we assessed linearity by examining scatter plots of the dependent 
variables (PALT and CPARS) and the covariate variable (VALUE). The plots revealed 
fairly linear relationships between the variables. 
Third, we assessed homogeneity of regression by performing an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA, which is practically the same as an ANCOVA but does not contain a 
covariate variable) that included the independent variable (LPTA or Tradeoff), the 
covariate VALUE, and the interaction between the independent variable and the 
covariate. The interaction term was not significant, which indicates that the relationship 
between the dependent variables (PALT and CPARS) and covariate (VALUE) is the 
same at both levels of the independent variable (LPTA or Tradeoff). Hence, the 
assumption of homogeneity of regression is upheld. 
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Finally, we checked for homogeneity of variance between groups using Bartlett’s 
Test. The results showed the difference in variance between the groups (LPTA and 
Tradeoff) are not significant, thus the assumption of homogeneity of variance is upheld. 
C. RESULTS 
Using CPARS as the dependent variable produced no significant findings. 
Essentially, we find no significant differences in contract success (as measured by 
CPARS data) between the two methodologies (LPTA and Tradeoff). Table 3 shows the 
results of this analysis. 
Table 3.   ANCOVA Using CPARS as the DV 
ANCOVA Using CPARS as the DV 
Source Partial SS^ df MS^^ F Prob > F 
Model 3.66 2 1.83 2.18 .1433 ns 
VALUE 1.81 1 1.81 2.16 .1601 ns 
LPTATO 1.77 1 1.77 2.11 .1650 ns 
Residual 14.25 17 .84   
Total 17.91 19 .94   
^ Partial sum of squares  ^^ Mean square 
Number of Observations = 20 
Root Mean Squared Error = .92 
R2 =  .2043 
Adjusted R2 = .1107 
 
Using PALT as the dependent variable, however, showed significant differences 
exist in the lead-time for acquisitions that use LPTA versus acquisitions that use 
Tradeoff, even when contract dollar value is taken into account. Specifically, LPTA 
acquisitions are much shorter than Tradeoff acquisitions (Mean LPTA = 170.67 days, 




Table 4.   ANCOVA Using PALT as the DV 
ANCOVA Using PALT as the DV 
Source Partial SS^ df MS^^ F Prob > F 
Model 435.24 2 217.62 5.57 .0083** 
VALUE 12.24 1 12.24 .31 .5795 ns 
LPTATO 197.27 1 197.27 5.05 .0315* 
Residual 1290.03 33 39.09   
Total 1725.26 35 49.29   
* p<.05  ** p<.01 
^ Partial sum of squares  ^^ Mean square 
Number of Observations = 36 
Root Mean Squared Error = 6.25 
R2 =  .2523 
Adjusted R2 = .2070 
 
As a final post-hoc analysis, we examined whether there were significant 
differences in PALT based on the procuring organization (NAVSEA vs. NAVAIR). No 
significant differences were found. 
D. DISCUSSION 
The results of this research should be viewed critically given the limited size and 
the unbalance nature of the sample. Our findings clearly suggest that PALT is 
significantly shorter by 227.5 days when contracts are awarded based on an LPTA source 
selection strategy, empirically lending support to what was previously only an anecdotal 
belief. This result was found even when contract dollar value was included in the model. 
In the DOD, the dollar value of the acquisition “trips” certain evaluation and review 
thresholds. The higher the dollar value, the more thresholds the requirement must pass 
prior to award, thus increasing lead time. Finding these results with dollar value included 
in the model lends credence to the notion that LPTA acquisitions are in fact shorter than 
Tradeoff source acquisitions. Given the dynamic nature of the DOD, shorter acquisition 
lead-time is typically preferred because it directly translates to delivering the requirement 




This chapter provided the results of our research. The chapter began with an 
overview of the data, to include a description of the data sources and a description of the 
spreadsheet created to gather the data. Next, the data and methodology were described, 
and the results of the research were presented. The final chapter includes a summary of 
the research, conclusions and areas for further research.   
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH  
This chapter provides a summary of the research, provides answers to our 
research questions, and recommends areas of further research.  
A. SUMMARY  
The DOD spends billions of dollars annually acquiring weapons systems, supplies 
and services to support the needs of the warfighters. Government acquisition 
professionals use the six steps of the contract management process to award the contracts 
for these good and services. The contract management process consists of pre-award, 
award, and post award phases. A key step in the contract management process is source 
selection, which occurs during the award phase. The two primary source selection 
strategies used to obtain the best value for the government are LPTA and Tradeoff. The 
purpose of this research is to determine potential relationships between the source 
selection strategy (LPTA or Tradeoff) and resultant contract outcomes. Data were 
collected from completed contract files at NAVAIR and NAVSEA, paying particularly 
attention to the source selection strategies chosen for each contract. The data were then 
analyzed to determine how the choice of source selection strategy affects contract 
outcomes. 
B. CONCLUSION 
To conclude this research, we present answers to the research questions posed in 
Chapter I. 
(1) How does the source selection strategy affect pre-award metrics (e.g., 
PALT, number of solicitation amendments, number of protests)?  
Our analyses proved that significant differences exist in the PALT based on 
source selection strategy. As illustrated in Figure 12, the PALT mean time for LPTA is 
170.67 days versus 443.67 days for Tradeoff. The results of our research lend support to 
the anecdotal assumption that Tradeoff contracts have a longer lead-time for award. 
 48 
Given the unbalanced nature of the data collected (30 Tradeoffs and 6 LPTA) it appears 
that major weapons system acquisition commands seems to favor a Tradeoff source 
selection strategy, as one would expect given the developmental nature of many weapon 
systems.  
 
Figure 12.  LPTA versus Tradeoff in Days 
The results of the analyses did not yield any significant findings regarding the 
number of solicitation amendments or the number of protests based on the source 
selection strategy chosen. It also did not produce any significant findings that would lead 
to a conclusion that a particular source selection strategy (LPTA or Tradeoff) produces a 
higher or lower occurrence of amendments or protests. Of the 36 cases evaluated, less 
than 10% (3 of 36 contracts) received a protest. Each protest was made to the GAO, two 
were dismissed and one denied. Given these few cases no further analysis was conducted. 
(2) How does the source selection strategy affect post-award outcomes (e.g., 
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting Systems [CPARS] ratings, 
Earned Value Management [EVM] performance metrics)? 
Only 55% of the contract data we collected had CPARS ratings. That is not to say 
that CPARS was not performed on these contracts, but simply that our PPIRs search did 
LPTA Tradeoff 
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not produce any CPARS data for 45% of the contracts reviewed. In our analysis of the 20 
contracts with CPARS data, we found no significant difference in contract outcomes 
based on source selection strategy (LPTA or Tradeoff). However, given the small size of 
our sample, the reliability of this finding is not strong. A much larger sample is required 
to accurately assess differences.   
We were unable to collect EVM performance metrics data on any of the contracts 
in our sample. EVM data was not available in the files we reviewed and our attempts to 
gain access to Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) failed. 
Therefore, our research is inconclusive with regard to EVM performance differences 
based on source selection strategy.  
(3) Does one source selection strategy consistently fare better than the other in 
terms of both pre-award metrics and post-award outcomes? 
The results of our research seem to suggest that an LPTA source selection 
strategy has a significantly shorter lead-time to contract award. That said, our finding 
should be viewed with caution as our sample size consisted of only a few LPTA cases 
(six)—a sample size that is too small and too unbalanced to produce fully reliable results. 
Also, the data were inconclusive in terms of linking a pre-award metric (i.e., number of 
solicitation modifications) to contract outcomes.  
(4) Do the contract outcomes (e.g., past performance data) justify the 
government paying a premium to award to other than the lowest bidder? 
More data is needed to answer this question. In particular, more CPARS ratings 
and EVM performance metrics are required to determine if the premium paid to award a 
contract to the other than lowest bidder is justified.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
The task of understanding the impact of a source selection strategy on resultant 
contract outcomes is a topic rich for further research. Our research is valuable in that it 
highlights the fact that more research is required to better understand the effects of source 
selection strategy on contract outcomes. Our recommendations for further research are 
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centered on the areas that proved to be the most difficult for us: collecting a large, well-
balance sample size and obtaining performance data (as measured by CPARS and EVM).  
(1) Larger and more balanced sample size 
While it is well known that a larger sample size produces more reliable results, it 
is important to note that collecting data proved to be far more time consuming than 
anticipated. Choosing to collect data from NAVAIR and NAVSEA had both advantages 
and disadvantages. The advantage is that as SYSCOMs, they had a large population of 
complex contracts to choose from. The disadvantage is that because the contracts are 
typically very large and complex, they took a considerable amount of time to mine for 
data. Therefore, any researcher attempting to understand this topic must plan 
accordingly—scrubbing a large, balanced (equal number of LPTA and Tradeoff 
contracts) sample will required a significant time commitment. Our recommendation is 
that this process be repeated in its entirety with a greater emphasis on collecting a large 
and balanced sample. 
(2) Greater access to past performance data (CPARS and EVM) 
We had very limited access to CPARS and no access to EVM at all. Therefore, 
we were unable to produce any reliable findings on the impact of a particular source 
selection strategy on contract outcomes. Though the results of the ANCOVA analysis 
described in Chapter IV suggest that there are no differences in outcomes (as measured 
by CPARS and EVM) between the two source selection strategies (LPTA and Tradeoff), 
we place little confidence in this finding given the size of our sample. Of the 36 cases, we 
were only able to collect CPARS data on 20 and zero data on EVM. Further research 
should be conducted with the focus of evaluating performance (CPARS and EVM) to 
examine contact outcome. Collecting EVM data will most likely require future 
researchers to concentrate on major acquisition commands, as they have a higher 
probability of having contracts that use EVM performance metrics.  
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